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THE SCRIVENER’S DILEMMA IN DIVORCE
MEDIATION: PROMULGATING PROGRESSIVE
PROFESSIONAL PARAMETERS
Robert Kirkman Collins*
“Our fetishization of the adversary system does lead to
injustice and inefficiencies.”
—Prof. Kermit Roosevelt1
I. INTRODUCTION
A festering ethical question for attorneys who practice divorce
mediation is the propriety of an ADR neutral drafting the settle-
ment agreement that memorializes the understandings a separating
couple reach through mediation and then crafting the forms
needed to allow those spouses to obtain an uncontested divorce
decree.  States are inconsistent in their rules permitting mediators
to utilize their professional expertise to complete the paperwork
process, even though it would appear that best practice would be
not only to permit but to encourage mediators to scribe the
couple’s documents at the conclusion of their negotiations, and to
guide them through the bewildering bureaucratic papers needed to
obtain their divorce decree.
The debate over divorce mediator drafting is, however, simply
part of the larger controversy of who, in the future, will be permit-
ted to be a dispute resolution professional in this nation.  Modern
mediation attorneys are seeking to discredit the false assumption
that divorce is essentially a legal problem, and declining to perpe-
trate the antique myth that every couple’s divorce need be resolved
in a trial analogous to a criminal prosecution—a dramatic court-
room battle in which past wrongs will be proven, a “bad” parent
identified and exposed, and “rights” determined by a wise judge
applying clear legal precedents to the facts of a particular couple.
* Director, Divorce Mediation Clinic and Visiting Clinical Professor of Law, Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law.  The author is a recovering matrimonial litigator who has practiced
family law and divorce mediation in New York City for nearly forty years.
1 Kermit Roosevelt, Richard A. Posner’s Divergent Paths: the Academy and the Judiciary,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/31/books/review/richard-a-posners-
divergent-paths-the-academy-and-the-judiciary.html?r=0.
691
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\17-3\CAC302.txt unknown Seq: 2 28-MAR-16 15:37
692 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION [Vol. 17:691
Today’s divorce mediation attorneys are even questioning the legal
profession’s self-serving fiction that attendance at law school and
admission to the Bar ensure competence in document drafting, and
that matters such as scribing settlement agreements and divorce
forms are so arcane as to beyond the ken of those without legal
training.
This Article starts with an examination of one state’s relatively
recent contribution to the controversy over divorce mediator draft-
ing, and then tours the nation to illuminate the confusing array of
approaches to this issue that have been adopted in different juris-
dictions.  It then steps back to examine the role that lawyers have
traditionally played in assisting or impeding access to justice for
divorcing couples, and explores why divorce mediation can now of-
fer a more appropriate approach than classic lawyering to marital
reorganization.  It concludes with an endorsement of attorney-
mediators acting as scriveners for their clients, and explores an ap-
proach that, at the cost of abandoning some romanticized notions
of law school education, would allow even non-legal mediation
professionals the authority to meet their couples’ critical needs for
access to the courthouse.
II. THE DRAFTING DEBATE, UPDATED
A few years ago a tremor ran through the divorce mediation
community in the state of Washington—not emanating from the
movement of tectonic plates on the West Coast, but from a seismic
shift induced by the promulgation of a two-page ethics opinion is-
sued by a committee of that state’s Bar Association.2  While only
an “advisory” comment from the Rules of Professional Conduct
Committee (and not the official position of the Washington State
Bar Association),3 WSBA Advisory Opinion 2223 purported to
prohibit lawyer-mediators from drafting the final settlement docu-
ments for couples that they had just guided to resolution.  This pro-
scription went far beyond the expected “unauthorized practice of
law” rules that bar non-lawyer mediators from drafting legal docu-
2 Wash. State Bar Ass’n of Prof’l Conduct Comm., Advisory Op. 2223 (2012), http://
mcle.mywsba.org/IO/print.aspx?ID=1669.
3 And, in fact, it is the Supreme Court of Washington that “bears the ultimate responsibility
for lawyer discipline.” Caitlin Park Shin, Drafting Agreements as an Attorney-Mediator: Revisit-
ing Washington State Bar Association Advisory Opinion 2223, 89 WASH L. REV. 1035 (2013)
(quoting In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against DeRuiz, 152 Wash. 2d 558, 572 (2004)).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\17-3\CAC302.txt unknown Seq: 3 28-MAR-16 15:37
2016] DILEMMA IN DIVORCE MEDIATION 693
ments; this ukase prohibited even divorce mediators who were at-
torneys in good standing from drafting the documents for their
otherwise unrepresented clients.  In doing so, the ethics committee
in Washington sought to add that state to the minority list of juris-
dictions4 that explicitly prohibit even attorney-mediators from con-
cluding their professional responsibilities by drafting the
documentation that memorializes the couple’s agreements.
The Washington ethics opinion—which has already been thor-
oughly and negatively analyzed elsewhere5—-didn’t stop there,
however; it also proceeded to prohibit any other lawyer—not just
the mediator, but even an independent attorney “scrivener”—from
drafting the documents for a mediated couple.6
The logic underlying the Washington State Opinion?  When a
lawyer-mediator finishes the mediation and stands ready to draft
documents, the opinion concludes that the ADR professional is no
longer mediating but “practicing law;” however, because the hus-
band and wife are divorcing, the opinion asserts that the two
spouses have a non-waiveable conflict of interest, and therefore
cannot be “represented” by a single attorney.
The fatal flaws in this logic?  First, the committee members
(none of whom, one suspects, either practices or approves of medi-
ation) have not grasped the revolutionary concept of practice by a
“neutral” attorney—the counselor as problem-solver rather than as
hired mercenary fighting for one “side” against the other.  Second,
the opinion declares that the drafting of a contract constitutes the
“practice of law,” which may be traditionally accurate, but may no
longer be considered universally true.
Finally, leaving theoretical discussions aside, the opinion over-
looks the reality that while people at the outset of divorce do have
conflicting interests, at that magical moment when the mediator
has helped them get to “Yes!”7 and the myriad details of their mar-
ital settlement have finally been worked through, the two spouses
no longer retain those opposing interests—they now have a single,
unified concern in getting their understandings accurately reduced
to writing and formalized, and their divorce papers correctly filled
4 Of the fifteen or so states that have explicitly addressed the issue, approximately twice as
many states permit the attorney-mediator to draft than prohibit it. For examples of the variety of
proscriptions promulgated, see infra Part. III.
5 Shin, supra note 3, at 1048–63.
6 The goal appears to be to generate employment for not just one, but for three attorneys—
the mediator, and separate counsel for each spouse.
7 WILLIAM L. URY, ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING
IN (1992).
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out and processed through the court.  While no one would seek to
resurrect the ancient “Doctrine of Unity” studied in Family Law,
which dealt with a married couple as a single entity under the his-
toric doctrine of “couverture” by simply obliterating the wife’s
identity and subsuming her rights under those of her husband, the
archaic concept of dealing with the “couple” as a single unit might
actually prove useful at this moment.8  At the outset of any divorce
the departing husband and wife do have potentially (if not actual)
adverse interests over an entire spectrum of parenting and financial
issues, but any conflicts become not only waiveable but non-exis-
tent once resolution of all of their substantive questions has been
achieved through mediation.  At that moment of consensus, all that
remains to be done is to memorialize and sign their agreement and
process their divorce papers—in which the parties’ interests are be-
yond being generally aligned . . . and actually congruent.9
The “real” reason for the Washington State opinion?  This
salvo seems to be yet another shot in the ongoing siege by matri-
monial litigators attempting to halt civilian flight away from their
traditional gladiatorial matrimonial practice—the most recent skir-
mish in the reactionary thirty-year turf war being fought by the
litigation bar since the inception of divorce mediation.
III. A SCRIVENER SCORECARD
Washington is now moving to place itself in the minority of
states that prohibit attorney-mediators from drafting; it does not
stand alone, however, in seeking to bar divorce mediation attor-
neys from drafting . . . and preserve billable hours for more tradi-
tional lawyers.
Currently, there is widespread disagreement among the vari-
ous jurisdictions as to the proper scope of document drafting au-
thority for an attorney practicing divorce mediation.10  There is
8 This would be analogous to the single-entity status of two people who hold property as
“tenants by the entireties.”
9 “[C]ommon representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in inter-
est even though there is some difference in interest among them.” WASH. RULES OF PROF’L.
CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 28.
10 For the would-be scrivener, there are actually two issues—the agreement, and the divorce
papers.  There’s more of a need for discretion (and therefore greater difficulty) in drafting the
particular points in a settlement agreement (both in the wording of the different provisions and
the decision to include or omit specific paragraphs or points), whereas in most jurisdictions
there’s only one acceptable way to prepare divorce documents or forms for the Court’s approval.
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simply no discernible consensus among the states as to whether the
divorce mediator, who is also a duly admitted attorney in that juris-
diction may, at the conclusion of a mediation in which the parties
have reached consensus on all their marital issues, appropriately
draft the settlement agreement that reflects and memorializes the
financial and parenting decisions made by the couple.11
The rules that do exist in each jurisdiction regarding the
proper professional parameters of an attorney practicing divorce
mediation must, unfortunately, be ferreted out from a variety of
state ethics opinions, disciplinary proceedings, Practice Guidelines,
and state Court Rules.12  The answers that do emerge from a re-
view of the fifty states, however, is less a contrasting study in black
and white and more of a spectrum approaching “Fifty Shades of
Grey”13—an array of rules ranging from “yes” to “no”. . .with a
bewildering variety of approaches in between.
A roll call of the states does suggests that a majority—but cer-
tainly not an overwhelming one—favors permitting the mediator to
act as scrivener; the bar associations of nine states have opined that
the drafting of the agreement by an attorney-mediator is prohib-
ited, while fourteen states find it permissible. (One state apparently
couldn’t figure it out.)14
A. Some States Say “Yes”
i. Indiana explicitly authorizes divorce mediators to draft
their clients’ settlement agreement and craft and submit a
proposed dissolution decree, a waiver of a final hearing,
On the other hand, when preparing papers—presumably on behalf of the plaintiff or petitioner
in the divorce proceeding, even if done with the consent of and as an accommodation to both
spouses, a mediation scrivener may be technically (even if not functionally) appearing as counsel
for one party in court in an official capacity—which seems both intuitively less than neutral and
closer to the traditional “practice of law.”
11 Discussed below is the exponentially more controversial issue of whether a non-attorney
mediator can—or in fact, should—draft operative settlement documents for their couple without
running afoul of UPL (Unauthorized Practice of Law) restrictions. See infra Part IX.
12 See Amy G. Applegate & Connie J.A. Beck, Self-Represented Parties in Mediation: Fifty
Years Later it Remains the Elephant in the Room, 51 FAM. CT. REV. 85, at 93-7 (2013).
13 With apologies to E.L. JAMES, FIFTY SHADES OF GREY (2013).
14 See Shin, supra note 3. The State Bar of Arizona couldn’t make up its mind in 1996 as to
whether a lawyer-mediator could draft the settlement documents, and simply advised lawyers
“to exercise their own professional judgment” on the issue (!). STATE BAR OF ARIZ. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT, ETHICS OP. 96-01 (1996).
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their parties’ child support agreement. . . and an income
withholding order.15
ii. Utah had originally determined that in divorce “a disin-
terested lawyer could not possibly conclude that a lawyer
could fairly and zealously represent both clients”;16 how-
ever, upon appeal the Board of Bar Commissioners held
it permissible for a mediator to draft if the couple is com-
mitted to the terms of their agreement, there are no un-
resolved points and there is informed consent, and the
arrangement is revealed to the court.17  (The following
year, Utah clarified that an attorney-mediator may draft
and file a legally-binding settlement document (and even
the related pleadings), recognizing that in so doing “the
lawyer will be jointly representing the parties in their
common goal of effecting proper legal filings or obtaining
judicial approval of their fully resolved issues.  Because
the parties in this situation have fully resolved their is-
sues, they are not considered ‘adverse’ under Rule
1.7(a)(1).”).18
iii. Massachusetts simply allows that the mediator “may par-
ticipate in the preparation of the written agreement”
emerging from the discussions, holding that an attorney-
mediator who drafts the settlement agreement is engaged
in the practice of law, but may do so with appropriate
disclosure.19
iv. Colorado looks to the Colorado Dispute Resolution Act
(“CDRA”) to find authorization for not only attorney-
mediators but even non-attorney mediators to draft the
settlement documents, declaring that:
The implication of the CDRA is that the settlement
agreement may be drafted by the mediator, for ap-
proval by the parties and their attorneys, if any, and
for signature by the parties.  Because the CDRA
clearly does not require the mediator to be a lawyer,
15 IND. RULES OF CT., Rules for Alternative Dispute Resolution R. 2.7 (F), IND. JUDICIARY
(May 14, 2015), http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/adr/.
16 UT. STATE BAR RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, ETHICS ADVISORY OP. NO. 05-03 (2005),
https://www.utahbar.org/ethics-advisory-opinions/eaoc-05-03.
17 Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, UT. COURTS, (last visited Feb. 25, 2016),
http:///www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/#ch13a/html.
18 UT. STATE BAR RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.4(c) (2006).
19 MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. UNIFORM R. ON DISPUTE RESOL. R. 7(g). See also MASS. BAR.
ASS’N. ETHICS OP., 85-3 (1985).
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it serves as statutory authority for a nonlawyer medi-
ator to draft a written settlement agreement.20
B. Some states say, “Well, if you must. . .”
i. Michigan gives grudging approval for mediator drafting,
providing a less than ringing endorsement: “Upon tenta-
tive resolution of the dispute, it is not inappropriate for a
mediator to suggest that the parties memorialize their un-
derstandings in a written document.  The lawyer, in the
role of neutral mediator, is not per se prohibited from
preparing the document.”21  (The main concern of Michi-
gan appears to be for mediators to discourage clients
from signing agreements without having retained sepa-
rate counsel.)
ii. Kansas affords a similarly heavy-handed approach to law-
yer employment; both the Supreme Court and Court Me-
diation Rules of Kansas allow for drafting, but insist that
the mediator pressure couples to retain counsel.22
iii. Maine holds that an attorney-mediator can draft the
agreement and ancillary documents—including the di-
vorce judgment.23  Formerly, the Maine Board of Over-
seers of the Bar24 had allowed preparation of the
agreement and court documents such as the judgment;
20 See Anthony van Westrum, Best Practices for Avoiding Unauthorized Practice of Law in
Mediation, 36 COLO. LAW. 21 (2007), https://www.cobar.org/repository/Inside_Bar/Alternative%
20Dispute%20Resolution/auog050615_TCL%20UPL%20Article.pdf.
21 MICH. INFORMAL ETHICS OP. RI-278 (1996), http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/
numbered_opinions?OpinionID=1148&Type=6&Index=A.
22 See KAN. SUP. CT. R. 901 (“The attorney-mediator advises and encourages the parties to
seek independent legal advice before the parties execute any settlement agreement drafted by
the attorney-mediator.”); See also KAN. SUP. CT. R. RELATING TO MEDIATION VII (D) (“Any
memo of understanding or the proposed agreement which is prepared in the mediation process
should be separately reviewed by independent counsel for each participant before it is signed.
While a mediator cannot insist that each participant have separate counsel, they should be dis-
couraged from signing any agreement, which has not been so reviewed.  If the participants, or
either of them, choose to proceed without independent counsel, the mediator shall warn them of
any risk involved in not being represented, including where appropriate, the possibility that the
agreement they submit to a court may be rejected as unreasonable in light of both parties’ legal
rights or may not be binding on them.”).
23 Applegate & Beck, supra note 12.
24 ME. BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR PROF’L. ETHICS COMM’N., ETHICS OP. 137
(1993), http://www.mebaroverseers.org/attorney_services/opinion.html?id=89822.
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now, the Maine Rules of Professional Conduct25 specifi-
cally permit the mediator to draft the “settlement agree-
ment or instrument reflecting the parties’ resolution of
the matter” so long as they urge participants to obtain
outside legal advice.  However, Rule 2.4(e)(3) cautions
that “upon conclusion of the mediation, the lawyer shall
not represent any of the parties in the matter that was the
subject of the mediation, or in any related matter,” thus
closing the door to the neutral’s submission of the divorce
papers.26
iv. Tennessee requires a mediator to “request that the terms
of any settlement agreement reached be memorialized
appropriately” and to discuss with the principals the pro-
cess for formalization;27 the Rules of Professional Con-
duct provide that a mediator: “(1) may, with the informed
consent of all the parties to the dispute. . . draft a settle-
ment agreement that results from the dispute resolution
process,” but “shall not otherwise represent any or all of
the parties in connection with the matter,”28 also preclud-
ing the mediator signing on as counsel or appearing in
court for the divorce papers.29
C. Some states say “Sort of. . .”
i. Virginia elected not to adopt ABA Model Rule 2.4, but
instead promulgated its own rules of ethical conduct re-
garding drafting.30  The Commonwealth appears more
preoccupied with limiting any evaluative tendencies of at-
torney-mediators than with drafting issues; it doesn’t ad-
dress the question of the propriety of the mediator
25 ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 2.4 (e)(2), http://www.courts.maine.gov/rules_admin
orders/rules/text/mr_prof_conduct_plus_2014-10-10.pdf.
26 The only mechanism for avoiding the ban would be to take the truly expansive definition
of the mediation not having “terminated” until the divorce process had been handled.
27 TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31 APP. A, §10(a)(1).
28 TENN. R. PROF’S. CONDUCT R. 2.44(e)(1), http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/2011_
TRPC_0.pdf.
29 But N.B. – providing both clients with assistance in filing out divorce forms so that each
can proceed pro se is not specifically prohibited.
30 VA. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 2.10 & R. 2.11, http://www.vsb.org/docs/2009-10-pg-
rpc.pdf; See also VA. GUIDELINES ON MEDIATION AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
(1999), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/resources/upl_
guidelines.pdf.
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scribing the agreement.  Virginia does, however, prohibit
a lawyer who has served as a third-party neutral (which
includes mediators under Rule 2.11(a)) from serving “as a
lawyer on behalf of any party to the dispute, nor re-
present one such party against the other in any legal pro-
ceeding related to the subject of the dispute resolution
proceeding.”31
ii North Dakota directs that in child custody mediations, the
mediator is “to reduce to writing any agreement of the
parties” and have them sign it . . . but then provides that
the contract isn’t binding on the parents until approved by
the court32—an approach also adopted by its neighbor,
South Dakota.33
D. Some states say “No!”
i. Illinois, in a State Bar Association Advisory Opinion on
Professional Conduct,34 states that a lawyer who mediates
with a couple cannot draft their settlement document
(nor craft their divorce papers), as that would constitute
legal representation of both sides in a litigation.  The
opinion reaffirms the determination of an earlier ethics
opinion35 that a “divorce, even when uncontested, is
litigation.”36
ii. Texas similarly concludes in an ethics opinion37 that be-
cause a “divorce, no matter how amicable or uncontested,
is a litigation proceeding under Texas law,” an attorney-
mediator can never be permitted “to represent both par-
ties” in preparing the documents to effectuate their medi-
ated agreement or process the divorce, because of the
31 VA. RULES, supra note 30, at R. 2.10 (e).
32 N.D. CENT. CODE §14-09.1-07 (2004), at http://www.legis.nd.gov/cencode/t14c09-1.pdf?
20160205172233.
33 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §25-4-61 (2004), http://legis.sd.gov/Statutes/Codified_Laws/Display
Statute.aspx?Statute=25-4&Type=Statute.
34 IL. STATE BAR ASS’N. PROF’L RULES OF CONDUCT, ETHICS OP. NO. 04-03 (2005), aff’d
2010.
35 IL. STATE BAR ASS’N. PROF’L RULES OF CONDUCT, ETHICS OP. NO. 98-06 (1998).
36 Id. (In fact, an uncontested divorce action is a ceremony, required simply because tradi-
tional court proceedings are built on the assumption that there must be an “adverse” party to
stand in opposition to any request for judicial relief.
37 TX. STATE BAR PROF’L ETHICS COMM., ETHICS OP. 583 (2008), http://www.klgates.com/
files/upload/Texas_Ethics_Opinion_583.pdf.
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spouses’ “potentially conflicting interests.”38  While pro-
viding the benefit of and unambiguous answer, the Texas
approach does elevate procedure over reality, in that—as
discussed above—only after all the terms of an agreement
have been worked out would the agreement be drafted
and submitted for approval to the court. . . which is a
point that the parties no longer have adverse interests.39
E. Some states that appear to say “NO”(but do)
i. Washington has the restrictions of Ethics Opinion 2223;
as discussed above, however, it’s only advisory in nature,
and not all practitioners have felt themselves bound by its
dictates.40
ii. New York State would appear to have prohibited the at-
torney/mediator as scrivener41 but as a practical matter
did not; it determined that a mediator cannot draft the
Agreement and divorce papers unless the mediator can
satisfy the “disinterested lawyer” test of DR 5-105(c), but
as a practical matter the test appears to have been
“passed” by every couple in the Empire State who reach
terms after mediation.42
F. Finally, some organizations say “Yes”
The ABA, it should be noted, does permit attorney drafting.
In 2010, the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolu-
38 Id. at R. 1.07.
39 The fact that all proceedings for marital dissolution in Texas are nominally “litigations”
reveals more about the inflexible system of procedures in the state  where both spouses cannot
jointly seek dissolution of the marriage  than about the inherently “litigious” nature of a marital
proceeding, once negotiations have resolved all the issues.
40 For more discussion, see presentations by Leslie Grove, Robert Kirkman Collins, Don
Desonier, Rina Goodman and Stephanie Bell, at Panel Discussion 7.7 (The Scrivener’s Di-
lemma: Mediators Who Draft Settlement Agreements (WSBA Advisory Opinion 2223)) given at
the 21st Annual Northwest Dispute Resolution Conference in Seattle, WA in March, 2014, http:/
/wsba-adr.org/page/2014-track-divorce-family.
41 NY STATE BAR ASS’N. COMM. ON PROF’L. ETHICS, OP. 736 (2001).
42 In 2010, an experienced attorney-mediator in New York State was brought up on discipli-
nary charges by the Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District (File No. 298190/10)
after court personnel (but not either client) objected to his having drafted a formal separation
agreement at the conclusion of a mediation; the charges were subsequently dropped.
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tion Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance issued an opinion
on the “Mediator’s Duty of Care When Drafting Agreements,”43
which permits an attorney-mediator to act as “scrivener” to memo-
rialize deal points, and to “add additional language” and draft the
operative settlement agreement if they have the professional expe-
rience and competence to do so.44  In addition, it should be noted
that the Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Medi-
ation also provide that “the mediator may document the partici-
pants’ resolution of their dispute.”45
IV. THE SCRIVENER SKIRMISH IN CONTEXT
Given that no clear consensus can be gleaned from the various
states as to the wisdom or propriety of an attorney-mediator draft-
ing a couple’s divorce settlement, where might be the solution be
found?  The answer lies in examining the issue in the context of an
overview of how divorce has been (and should be) handled in this
country, and then in a microscopic exploration of how best the
drafting problem should be addressed as a practical matter.
The wide disparity among rules prohibiting or permitting law-
yer-mediators to draft the operative settlement documents is best
viewed as a skirmish in the larger battle to end the “legalization” of
domestic disputes and terminate the traditional attorney monopoly
as the only accredited dispute resolution professionals in the
nation.
Such an evolution—or revolution—is much needed.  Since the
country’s founding, each of the United States has maintained with
public funds a court system for the determination of family dis-
putes; in recent times, however, those courts have increasingly be-
come accessible to only the privileged few.  By and large,
matrimonial litigations have developed into wars of attrition, inac-
cessible except to the well-resourced.  With procedural paths so
complex as to require expensive, professional sherpas in the form
of attorneys to act as guides, litigation becomes a luxury affordable
43 ABA SEC. OF DISP. RESOL. COMM. ON MEDIATOR ETHICAL GUIDANCE SODR-2010-1,
http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/more.cfm?com=DR018600&mod=12.
44 For a critical view of this approach, see Elayne E. Greenberg, Two for the Price of One is a
Costly Choice: the Ethical Issues for Lawyer-Mediators Who Consider Drafting Agreements, 3
NYSBA NY DISP. RESOL. LAW. (2010).
45 MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAM. AND DIVORCE MEDIATION. VI. E. (2000).
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only by a privileged minority of the population.46  While the prob-
lem is growing worse, it is not new; even a generation ago former
President Jimmy Carter wryly observed: “Ninety percent of our
lawyers serve ten percent of our people.  We are over-lawyered and
underrepresented.”47
Yet doesn’t divorce of necessity require handling by attorneys
in court?  Shouldn’t family dissolution necessarily involve inter-
preting and applying statutes and precedents to a particular fam-
ily’s facts, with lawyers protecting the rights of the parties?  In
some particularly difficult and sophisticated cases this might be so,
but for the nation to continue to approach all divorces as if each
one involved complex legal matters requiring attorney guidance
and judicial intervention instead of caring assistance through a
messy mix of financial problems, personal issues, and parenting di-
lemmas well within the ken of the principals actually distorts the
process, and adds to the participants’ agony.
One hundred years ago, when Woodrow Wilson occupied the
White House, perhaps domestic difficulties needed to be handled
exclusively by attorneys in courts of law; however, to continue to
view divorce today though that same limited litigation lens works a
grave distortion of the realities.  A century ago, divorce was rare.48
It came about only as the result of behavior that was (or closely
bordered on) criminal behavior—adultery, cruelty, or desertion.49
It marked a tragic and scandalous breakdown in the social order,
for which spouses would bear the stigma for the remainder of their
natural lives.  Judges granted divorces reluctantly, and only when
truly egregious marital misconduct could be proven, but never if
one or both spouses simply wanted to end the marriage.  Courts
necessarily intervened to make sure that children and women—the
economically vulnerable parties of the day—were protected
through orders of child support and alimony.
46 In fact, by the turn of this Century, 80% of matrimonial cases involved at least one self-
represented party. See Madelynn Herman & Bruce Povda, Self Representation Pro Se Statistics
Memorandum, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. (Sept. 25, 2006).
47 Quoted in Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 369, 371 (2004).
48 For an official, excruciatingly detailed statistical analysis of divorce in the United States
exactly 100 years ago, see U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1916. (US
Gov’t Printing Office) (1919), https://ia700406.us.archive.org/5/items/cu31924081073839/
cu31924081073839.pdf.
49 In 1916, over three-quarters of all divorces were granted for the commission of acts of
adultery (11.5%), cruelty (28.3%), or desertion (36.8%). U.S DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION, AND WELFARE, DECEMBER, 100 YEARS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS UNITED
STATES 1867–1967, 49 (1973), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_21/sr21_024.pdf.
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Much has changed in the last century.  Divorce is now a com-
mon50 if not commonplace phenomenon; depending on the statis-
tics credited, an average of some fifty percent of all marriages end
in divorce.  Divorce is no longer the rare, shameful exit from mar-
riage reluctantly granted to exceptionally and tragically dysfunc-
tional families unable to sustain important societal norms, but an
unfortunate though hardly surprising outcome in nearly a majority
of marriages.  Unlike a century ago, immediate no-fault divorce is
now available in all fifty states,51 requiring nothing more than one
party publically proclaiming that the marriage has failed, without
any obligation to allege (much less prove) that the other spouse
had engaged in despicable behavior.  Given the universality of no-
fault divorce, there is no longer any reason other than institutional
inertia to continue to treat each divorce case as if it were a quasi-
criminal investigation;52 there is no single person who needs to be
determined by trial to be at “fault”. Yet we still frame the discus-
sion of divorce as if every couple needed to “lawyer up” and expect
that a judge will assess blame in a quasi-criminal proceeding, divide
assets, establish parenting roles and rule, and set support . . . be-
cause both spouses are incompetent to reach their own resolutions.
But trial is a fiction in divorce.  Some ninety-seven percent of
all matrimonial cases end up in a settlement short of adjudication,
so it’s a pernicious myth for the vast majority of people that mat-
ters will be decided by a judge.  We still promulgate the notion that
the expected finale will ultimately take place in court when virtu-
ally all cases do settle before trial . . . and that couples therefore
need professional guides in the form of attorneys to do formal dis-
covery and stage manage a courtroom showdown.  It is an expen-
sive miscalculation—and the matrimonial litigators who profit
from the system do precious little to dispel the notion.
50 For the statistics now kept by the Federal Government’s Center for Disease Control and
Prevention, see National Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, NAT’L VITAL STAT. SYSTEM (Nov.
23, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm.
51 New York belatedly joined the other forty-nine states in discovering the brave new world
of no-fault divorce without a statutory waiting period on Columbus Day (October 12) of 2012.
N.Y. DOM. REL. L. 170(7).
52 Certainly in cases that require ferreting out hidden assets, discovery  or perhaps trial
might be needed; however, the vast majority of divorces involve W-2 wage earners, for whom
the ability to secrete assets is limited, at best.
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V. TWO METHODOLOGIES FOR MONOPOLY
Unfortunately, some lawyers carefully and craftily play on two
mechanisms of control to maintain their monopoly on access to jus-
tice in divorce court.  Sadly, those litigators are rewarded for fight-
ing through hourly fees, rather than being incentivized for using
their wisdom, wit and expertise to work out solutions for clients in
marital transition.  And, tragically, people going through the fright-
ening chaos of having their family life dissolve are particularly vul-
nerable to the claims of practitioners who advocate that divorce is
a terrifying “legal” problem . . . and that the public therefore needs
to pay litigators to “protect them” and “enforce their rights.”53
(Who, one frequently wonders when observing litigators at work in
the Courthouse, is there to protect the people from these lawyers
who claim to be protecting them?).
How is fear turned to profit? Historically, two major impedi-
ments have been utilized by the organized bar to limit universal
access to justice in divorce (language and procedure) and seven
myths (as set out below) promulgated to keep people herded
within the “system.”
Divorce lawyers, traditionally, have shrouded their work in
historically venerable but obscure verbiage, accessible only to the
professionally initiated. Attorneys continue to draft divorce agree-
ments in outmoded, incomprehensible legal jargon. One suspects
that by making the “standard” language arcane and impenetrable
to the general public, continuation of the monopoly of the guild of
lawyers is protected.54 (Although it should be noted that the use of
53 Even the progressive attorneys adopting a “collaborative lawyering” approach, which
seeks settlement and eschews the self-fulfilling prophesy that court intervention is necessary to
resolve matrimonial matters, still posit the process as one that needs to be guided by attorneys,
rather than by the spouses. See SHEILA M. GUTTERMAN, COLLABORATIVE LAW: A NEW MODEL
FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION (BRADFORD PUBLISHING, 2004).
54 A standard mutual estate waiver in a marital settlement agreement used by the author in
practice reads:
Each of the parties hereby waives, renounces, grants, remises and releases to the other for-
ever, for all purposes whatsoever, all rights in the property of the other, including but not limited
to dower, curtesy, community property, and equitable distribution or a distributive award of
marital property, all rights and interests which he or she may have or hereafter acquire in the
real or personal property or estate of the other wheresoever situated and whether acquired
before or subsequent to the marriage of the parties or before or subsequent to the date of the
execution of this Agreement, by reason of his or her inheritance or descent or by virtue of any
decedent or estate law or any statute or custom, or arising out of the marital relation, or for any
other reason whatsoever, and each party hereby expressly waives and releases any right of elec-
tion under this state’s Estates, Powers and Trusts Law or any successor statute thereto, or any
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linguistic legal obfuscation to control access to justice is hardly a
recent problem.)55
Unfortunately, procedural complexities as well as linguistic
obfuscation also preclude people’s direct access to justice.  Since
the start of the 20th Century we have assigned the task of dissolv-
ing marriages to courts,56 but increasingly, as a practical matter,
only the wealthiest can now afford effective access to them.  We
would consider it unconscionable to allow a town’s Fire Depart-
ment to only respond to conflagrations in burning houses that were
the residences of couples making in excess of $200,000 per year . . .
yet divorce courts, which also provide much-needed public services
to families in crisis, are effectively accessible only to the privileged
minority of the population who can afford the private guidance of
attorneys.
These twin gatekeepers of arcane language and procedural
mysteries help sustain a virtually impenetrable thicket around the
process of divorce; unfortunately, in addition there is a set of no-
tions about the process of divorce that further pushes the public
into remaining in the classic litigation track.
VI. SEVEN FATAL FALLACIES OF DIVORCE
People going through divorce are maneuvered into remaining
in the historic litigation system through exposure to seven system-
atically promulgated but pernicious fictions that disempower them:
other law of any state, territory and jurisdiction, to take against the Last Will and Testament or
codicils thereto of the other, whether heretofore or hereafter executed, including but not limited
to any right to elect to take, as against the same, the intestate share to which he or she would
otherwise be entitled, and each party hereby renounces and waives any right to administration of
the estate of the other party, and further waives any right to be or become the legal representa-
tive of the other’s estate.
Why not simply state: “Each of us shall be free to do what we choose in our wills, and we
waive any right in the other’s estate?”  Is it because the “legalese” text requires a professional
guide to draft, interpret and translate, whereas the “Plain English” version is immediately and
universally accessible?  The rights waived and exchanged in both the arcane and modern lan-
guage are identical . . . and when was the last claim for dower or curtesy asserted in a court in
this nation, or the last occasion a practitioner really needed to navigate the subtle distinctions
under Anglo-Saxon rules of pleading among “waives, renounces, grants, remises or releases?”
55 Famously, two millennia ago it was objected: “Woe unto ye, ye lawyers!  For ye take away
the key of knowledge.  Ye enter not in yourselves, and those that would enter, ye hinder.” King
James Bible, Luke 11:52.
56 In colonial times and well into the Nineteenth Century many states assigned the right to
dissolve a marriage to their state legislature. See DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION OXFORD
UNIV. PRESS, 1991.).
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i. THE FICTION OF COMBAT: That divorcing couples
are inevitably enemies, and must act accordingly;57
ii. THE DISTORTION OF COMPETENCE: That divorc-
ing couples are incompetent to make their own decisions
or even conduct their own dialogue;58
iii. THE MYTH OF COURT: That divorcing couples face a
set of essentially legal problems that must ultimately be
determined by a Judge;
iv. THE ERROR OF COST: That in order to divorce
couples must be resigned to exhaust themselves both fi-
nancially and emotionally;
v. THE ROLE OF CAUSATION: That determination of
who was “at fault” for ending the marriage is of
importance;
vi. THE CANARD OF “CUSTODY”: That children are
possessions to be won or lost in the battle between their
parents; and
vii. THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL: That the attorneys and
not the principals should be in charge of the process . . .
and participate in determining the outcome.
VII. RETHINKING DIVORCE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
Over the last thirty-odd years, however, the practice of divorce
mediation has been working a quiet revolution, challenging the no-
tion that divorce should be approached as a purely legal issue and
starting to “outsource” it to problem-solvers not necessarily a part
of the traditional legal establishment.  Divorce mediators, drawn
from the ranks of burnt-out litigators seeking a less brutal and
more rational professional practice, have joined with therapists and
others from the helping professions to assist people to minimize
the gratuitously brutal side-effects of divorce in court.
The elimination of the necessity for any judicial finding of
wrong-doing in divorce created by the shift away from “fault” di-
vorce in the late 1960s and early 1970s has helped ease the need for
57 Tennessee’s Rules of Professional Conduct, for instance, determine that “a lawyer cannot
undertake common representation of clients between whom contentious litigation is imminent
or who contemplate contentious negotiations, as is often the case when dissolution of a marriage
is involved.” TENN. RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 2.2[6].
58 “The client should be cautioned not to discuss the matter with the spouse, but rather refer
any questions or inquiries to the attorney through the spouse’s own lawyer.” WILLARD H. DA-
SILVA, N.Y. STATE BAR ASSOCIATION: MATRIMONIAL LAW 45 (2011).
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individual legal representation.59  Divorce no longer need be about
which spouse did what to whom in the past, but is now free to focus
on helping couples plan for their future . . . and that is precisely the
approach that mediation takes. Even after over three decades of
practice, however, mediation remains a radical approach to
divorce.
The threat posed by the divorce mediation movement has
been clear to the matrimonial bar from the very outset. Typical of
the sanctimonious and self-serving rhetoric was a proclamation
made by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York some
thirty years ago; when facing the nascent specter of divorce media-
tion, they declared that:
[T]he complex and conflicting interests involved in a particular
matrimonial dispute, the difficult legal issues involved, the sub-
tle legal ramifications of particular resolution and the inequality
in bargaining power resulting from differences in the personali-
ties or sophistication of the parties make it virtually impossible
to achieve just result free from later recriminations or bias or
malpractice, unless both parties are represented by separate
counsel.60
A generation of divorce mediators and their relieved and satis-
fied clients have put a lie to that dire prognostication . . . but insti-
tutionally, most divorces are still addressed as if they were incipient
litigations.  Alas, they needn’t—and shouldn’t—be.
VIII. THE PREMISE OF MEDIATION
Divorce mediation has, however, grown over the last genera-
tion as a common-sense alternative to matrimonial litigation pre-
cisely because it challenges those seven myths of litigation:
i. COMBAT: Mediation works a paradigm shift, helping
each person deal with the other as a former partner facing
a shared set of problems for the future, rather than as an
enemy or adversary.
ii. COMPETENCE: Mediation reinforces—nay insists—on
the competence and authority of the two people directly
involved to negotiate and reach their own decisions about
59 See John Lande, The Revolution in Family Law Dispute Resolution, 24 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. L. 411 (2012).
60 NY BAR ASS’N COMM. ON PROF’L. CONDUCT, OP. 80–23 (1981).
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their children, finances, and the outlines of their future
lives.
iii. COURT: Mediation refocuses negotiations away from the
courthouse and abstract debates of “rights” and “The
Law”; participants are informed of statutory standards,
but liberated to adopt solutions that make sense to them,
given whom they have been and the understandings and
expectations by which they had previously conducted
their lives.
iv. COST: Mediation enables couples to reach resolution in a
time-frame of months rather than years, and with a cost
measured in a few thousand dollars rather than tens or
hundreds of thousands of dollars.  (The emotional savings
for them and for their children of proceeding in a forum
that doesn’t permanently demonize the other parent is
quite simply incalculable.).
v. CAUSATION: Mediation focuses on plans for the fu-
ture—and refuses to afford the couple a forum for the
destructive and ultimately futile squabbles of trying to
win their departing spouse’s acceptance of their view of
what had happened in the past.
vi. “CUSTODY”: Mediation avoids the competitive contest
of labeling and helps parents work through the practical
details of how each will remain in relationship with their
children through a viable parenting schedule and a
method for decision-making, even after the adults start to
live in separate households.
vii. CONTROL: Mediation insists that attorneys play the role
of counselors and not of principals, allowing the spouses
to retain greater control over both the process of discus-
sion and the decisions that flow as the outcome.
These benefits offered by mediation have, however, brought
with them a reaction from the organized bar, who (correctly) per-
ceive a growing competition for the “consumers” of divorce ser-
vices, many of whom now elect to proceed outside the classic
litigation system.  It is hardly surprising that impediments to the
practice of mediation—such as bar rules against the drafting of me-
diated agreements—should be strewn in the path of the radical re-
formers whenever possible.
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IX. DRAFTING DILEMMAS – ROLES AND RULES
Other than the economic professional threats posed by the
growth of mediation and these larger questions of the democratiza-
tion and de-legalization of divorce, there are particular, practical
reasons why the question of mediator drafting should be resolved
in favor of scribing. Focusing back on the specific question of medi-
ator drafting, the better outcome would certainly be to permit—if
not encourage—mediators to be the scriveners of their parties’
agreement.
In times past, a “scrivener” was simply a “professional or pub-
lic copyist or writer”61—a minor legal functionary fulfilling the role
of amanuensis recording (rather than as the professional creating)
the content of a contract. The concept is useful to the present in-
quiry because the term captures the essential truth that at the mo-
ment that a divorce mediator finishes helping an unhappy couple
reach all the parenting and financial terms of their marital settle-
ment agreement, that neutral’s role in generating the documents to
memorialize those understandings (and filling out the papers to ob-
tain their divorce decree from the Court) is more analogous to the
ministerial one of reflecting the settlement terms accurately on pa-
per rather than the “representation” of one client’s interests
against the other familiar from traditional litigation contests.62
This question of what the mediator’s transcribing role should
be actually incorporates four related but distinct inquiries.  First, it
is necessary to distinguish between the task of drafting the compre-
hensive agreement and the less creative (but traditionally more
lawyerly function) of generating and presenting divorce papers in
court for a Judge’s approval and the issuance of a decree.  The first
set of questions is therefore whether an attorney-mediator should
draft a) the settlement agreement, and b) the divorce filings.  Sec-
ond, while all mediators may be created equal, not all have the
same professional credentials—and the answers to these same two
questions may perhaps be different depending on whether the me-
diator is a duly admitted attorney in the jurisdiction or a non-attor-
ney mediator.  The second set of questions is therefore: should a
61 http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/scrivener.
62 The term is probably best known from its use by Nathanial Hawthorne in his enigmatic
short story, “Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street,” first published in the middle of the
19th Century. NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, BARTLEBY, THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL
STREET (1853).
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NON-attorney mediator draft a) the agreement, and b) the divorce
filings.
As explored earlier, in many jurisdictions it is commonplace
for the settlement agreement to be drafted by the mediator who is
also an attorney,63 and there is a practical and procedural efficiency
in not having to bring in and educate a second, outside professional
to the terms of any settlement.  As has been previously observed in
this Journal, “An effective divorce mediator must be able to draft
custody and/or other agreements such as property division agree-
ments.”64  If an outside drafter must be employed, the details of the
agreements reached in the mediation sessions must somehow be
transmitted to the scrivener; the alternative is to let one party
transmit the information to their own counsel for drafting, which
runs the risk of partisan distortion and may induce strategic, rather
than neutral, drafting.65
While a rule against attorney-mediator drafting may profit the
current professional gatekeepers, from the public’s perspective it
makes little sense.  As a practical matter, the mediator has been
personally involved in the negotiation of all the details of the set-
tlement, and remains in the best position to record on paper pre-
cisely what the couple had decided to do.  Clarity as to the
conclusions reached is an obligation owed by mediators to their
clients, and “it remains the mediator’s duty to be sure that the par-
ticipants do not leave the mediation without a complete under-
standing of the details of their agreement.”66 Indeed, one reason
that couples might opt for an attorney-mediator in the first in-
stance is the assumption that as a lawyer this neutral will be draft-
ing the agreements emerging from the mediation,67 and it is even
predicted that documents scribed by these attorneys run a lesser
risk of rejection by counsel for the individual clients or the Court.68
It is simply inefficient for an attorney-mediator to draft up an
interim “Memorandum of Understanding,” just to have another at-
63 Dee M. Samuels & Joel A. Shawn, The Role of the Lawyer Outside the Mediation Process,
1 MED. Q. 2, 16 (1983).
64 Jaime Abraham, Divorce Mediation Limiting the Profession to Family/Matrimonial Law-
yers; 10 CARDOZO J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 241, 260 (2008).
65 A large number of people going through divorce will also simply not be able to afford to
have an attorney do the drafting.
66 KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION IN A NUTSHELL 207 (2003).
67 Stephanie A. Henning, A Framework for Developing Mediator Certification Programs, 4
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 189, 471-2 (1999).
68 Abraham, supra note 64 (citing David L. Price, Client to Client Divorce Mediation, 44
ORANGE CTY L. 10, 10 (2002).
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torney translate the deal terms from plain English into “legalese”.
The concept of a Memorandum of Understanding (or “MOU”)
was created by John Haynes, “the best of the best among
mediators,”69 and one of the founders of the divorce mediation
profession.70 The MOU was always meant to be a simple interim
document to memorialize the agreements of the parties in plain
English; drafted without signature lines, a Memorandum of Under-
standing was not meant to serve as the binding document executed
by the parties and submitted to the Court.71  It was designed to
allow the couple to review a detailed, written recitation of their
agreed-upon proposals to ensure accuracy and communicate the
deal points to whatever professional scrivener would draft the op-
erative legal agreement.
If the mediator is an attorney, the MOU is simply a wasteful
exercise.  Who pays for the extra time spent in drafting this interim
document that transmits the deal points to the scribe?  What de-
tails may be lost when the operative document is generated by
someone other than the professional who was present for all of the
negotiating sessions?  What can be done for those many couples
who—given the inevitable economic crises arising from the addi-
tional costs of a second household in divorce—cannot afford to
hire outside counsel to study and draft the formal agreement from
the informal one?
For mediators who are attorneys, it makes little sense not to
do the scribing of the final papers; they should simply draft the
deal.
X. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW PROBLEMS
What, however, of non-attorney mediators?  The drafting of
contracts for clients has traditionally been the province of the legal
profession, and there have been nightmare examples of Unautho-
rized Practice of Law proceedings brought against non-attorney
69 Paula M. Young, A Connecticut Mediator in a Kangaroo Court?  Successfully Communi-
cating the ‘Authorized Practice of Mediation’ Paradigm to ‘Unauthorized Practice of Law’ Disci-
plinary Bodies, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1055 (2008).
70 JOHN M. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THERAPISTS AND
COUNSELORS (SPRINGER PUBLISHING, 1981).
71 This was Haynes solution for non-attorney mediators to the “Unauthorized Practice of
Law” problem; id, at 175.
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mediators72 and even an attempt to discipline an attorney-mediator
who drafted the parties’ formal agreement.73
But what actually constitutes as “the practice of law”?
Problems arise when authorities simply prohibit as the protected
province of lawyers all acts that are traditionally within the com-
pass of an attorney’s traditional duties; one immediately falls into a
Kafkaesque, circular universe that codifies historic turf boundaries
and permits no change or innovations that would erode the legal
monopoly.  In effect, progress is prohibited.74  If an activity had
previously fallen within the Legal Guild’s territory, courts continue
to afford the protection.  Defining the practice of law as those tasks
that have traditionally fallen within the purview of attorneys pro-
vides a convenient crystallization of boundaries that precludes
change.
However, there is an alternative approach to defining permis-
sible behaviors of “legal” practice by specifying actions, rather than
delineating boundaries.
XI. A PRACTICAL APPROACH—THE CERTIFIED
MEDIATION SCRIVENER
One answer may be to promulgate expanded professional pa-
rameters that define drafting boundaries under a new paradigm.
As with the “practice of law,” perhaps it is simply impossible to
define the enigma of what divorce mediation is using existing
frames of reference. It is not the practice of law, but does involve
legal practice—a recognized paradox (“Not all law practiced by
non-lawyers is unauthorized.”)75  It is not therapy, although the
process frequently provides therapeutic moments.  Nor is it finan-
cial planning . . . but it does help people make economic plans for
the future.  Rather than continue to struggle to delineate the ap-
propriate boundaries of mediation using the framework of its myr-
iad professions of origin, perhaps it is easier—and more
72 See, e.g., Young, supra note 69, at n. 43.
73 NY STATE BAR ASS’N., supra note 41.
74 See, e.g., State Bar Ass’n of Conn. v. Conn. Bank & Trust Col, 140 A.2d, 863,871 (Conn.
1958) (noting that the Connecticut Court of Appeals proclaimed “We do not hesitate to say,
however, that if the record indicated that [an activity] would be “commonly understood to be the
practice of law,” we would hold that the acts performed constituted the unlawful practice of
law.).
75 Westrum, supra note 20.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CAC\17-3\CAC302.txt unknown Seq: 23 28-MAR-16 15:37
2016] DILEMMA IN DIVORCE MEDIATION 713
constructive—to adopt an entirely new perspective. . . and describe
acceptable activities.
Ironically—but perhaps with poetic justice—Washington
State, in the very same year that it re-kindled the debate over
whether attorney-mediators should draft documents in its advisory
ethics opinion, also approved a process for NON-lawyer mediators
to draft documents which perhaps provides a possible solution to
the drafting enigma.76  In 2012, that state’s Supreme Court promul-
gated a Practice Rule for “Limited License Legal Technicians” in
response to the “wide and ever-growing gap in necessary legal and
law related services for low and moderate income persons.”77  The
rule requires training (and certification after testing) of people with
given educational credentials (short of a law degree), who would
then be authorized to help people craft the paperwork for their
divorces.
Drawing on that model, separate instruction and testing for
certification as an independent “C.M.S.”—“Certified Mediation
Scrivener”—might well answer the question of who should be enti-
tled to draft the documents emerging from mediation—eschewing
the debate over whether drafting is or is not the practice of law,
and simply authorizing those people deemed competently trained
to perform the task. (The precedent would be to parallel the certifi-
cation process utilized to authorize practice for another antique,
quasi-legal factotum—the Notary Public.).
Truth be told, most marital settlement agreements are assem-
bled rather than drafted.  Instruction on the necessary components
of the agreement, and provision of an encyclopedia of commonly
used clauses to select from, could allow drafting of some 95% or
more of each document, without any original literary efforts by the
“scrivener.”78 This is a narrow, focused skill set.
76 See SUP. CT. OF WASH., ORDER NO. 25700-A-1005, http://www.wsba.org/~/media/Files/
Licensing_Lawyer%20Conduct/LLLT/20120615%20SCt%20Order%20%20Legal%20Technici
an%20Rule.ashx; See also Limited Practice Rule for Limited License Legal Technicians, WASH.
CTS. (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.display&group=ga&
set=APR&ruleid=gaapr28.
77 Id.
78 There are a limited number of combinations and permutations for most of the foreseeable
issues in a marital settlement agreement, and these can be provided to the sanctioned scriveners
to choose from — paragraphs, say, for: a) he keeps the car, which is in his name; b) she transfers
the car, which is in her name, to him; c) she keeps the car, which is in her name; d) he transfers
the car, which is in his name, to her; e) they transfer the car, which is in both names, to him; f)
they transfer the car, which is in both names, to her; g) they sell the car, and divide the proceeds
as follows: . . . . Particular cases will inevitably call for hand-crafted provisions, but the vast
majority of possible outcomes for the issues in a divorce can be taken “off the shelf.”
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If drafting professionals could be recognized and certified, ex-
perienced mediators without law degrees could be tested to insure
competence in drafting settlement documents and authorized to
help their mediation clients to closure without the ominous threat
of Unauthorized Practice of Law prosecutions.79
(At the risk of offending some colleagues, it might also be pru-
dent to also have even divorce mediators who have J.D. degrees sit
for certification as a “Certified Mediation Scrivener” unless a given
practitioner were sufficiently experienced to be “grandfathered” in
(by perhaps submitting five previously drafted marital settlement
agreements for review).  Neither graduating from law school nor
passing the Bar actually provides any practical training in drafting
marital agreements or divorce pleadings; these skills are neither
taught in law schools nor tested in admission to the Bar.  Unfortu-
nately, law schools have for generations erred on the side of striv-
ing to be graduate institutions rather than professional schools that
train their students for practice.)80
Washington State Ethics Opinion 2223 invokes the State’s stat-
utory definition of the practice of law as the application of judg-
ments to the situation of another “which require the knowledge
and skill of a person trained in the law.”81 It is time we admitted
that law schools simply do not prepare their students to actually
practice law.82 However, drafting marital settlement agreements
and the accompanying divorce papers actually do not require the
skills of a person trained in law school; they require the skills of a
scrivener trained in drafting divorce documents.
There is no good reason to assume that only an attorney can
draft a settlement agreement—or, for that matter, that an attorney
is already competent to do so simply because of their J.D. degree.
Perhaps it is time to extract these tasks from the theoretical de-
bates that surround them, and simply have each state certify those
79 Colorado, for example, licenses real estate brokers to fill out legal forms on behalf of
clients, determining by examination those deemed to be competent to be among those licensed
by the state “to ‘practice law’ in limited situations.”
80 Few courses offered in American law schools provide useful instruction in the practice of
divorce law—certainly not the commonly available but universally theoretical survey course in
“Family Law”—much less the fine art of drafting a marital settlement agreement. The author
takes pride that the Divorce Mediation Clinic, and the course offered in New York Matrimonial
Drafting and Procedures at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in New York City that are
exceptions to this rule.
81 WASH. CT. GEN. R. 24(a) (2002).
82 The level of institutional denial in this regard is breathtaking. See, e.g., The Emperor’s
New Clothes in HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES AND STORIES,
TRANS.  ERIK CHRISTIAN HAUGAARD 77 (Anchor Books, 1983).
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professionals—regardless of background—who demonstrate com-
petence as authorized to perform these much-needed tasks as an-
cillary functions to their duties as divorce mediators.
XII. CONCLUSION
Despite the conflicting opinions from across the country as to
the wisdom or propriety of an attorney-mediator drafting the set-
tlement agreement for their mediated couples, it seems appropriate
to accept the practice as an essential and efficient extension of the
divorce mediation process. Old, monopolistic unauthorized prac-
tice of law restrictions can and should be abandoned, and well-
trained mediators—whether attorneys or not—should be formally
credentialed to draft settlement agreements and assist couples in
filling out the papers to obtain their divorce.
We as a nation need to do more to expand access to justice for
the large number of couples who need divorce, rather than seeking
to impede those who help provide such avenues—even if to do so
means the abandonment of some venerated notions of the role of
lawyers and a challenge to entrenched economic interests.  The
simplification and democratization of dispute resolution—rather
than the preservation of a historic professional monopoly—should
be our goal in the century to come.
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